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Abstract—Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communications has
drawn significant interest recently due to many advantages
such as low cost, high mobility, and on-demand deployment.
This paper addresses the issue of physical-layer security in a
UAV communication system, where a UAV sends confidential
information to a legitimate receiver in the presence of a potential
eavesdropper which are both on the ground. We aim to maximize
the secrecy rate of the system by jointly optimizing the UAV’s
trajectory and transmit power over a finite horizon. In contrast
to the existing literature on wireless security with static nodes,
we exploit the mobility of the UAV in this paper to enhance the
secrecy rate via a new trajectory design. Although the formulated
problem is non-convex and challenging to solve, we propose an
iterative algorithm to solve the problem efficiently, based on
the block coordinate descent and successive convex optimization
methods. Specifically, the UAV’s transmit power and trajectory
are each optimized with the other fixed in an alternating manner
until convergence. Numerical results show that the proposed
algorithm significantly improves the secrecy rate of the UAV
communication system, as compared to benchmark schemes
without transmit power control or trajectory optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
With many advantages such as high mobility, low cost,
and on-demand deployment, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
have been more widely used in both military and civilian appli-
cations such as transport, surveillance, search and rescue, etc.
Recently, UAVs have also found increasingly more applica-
tions in wireless communications [1], such as mobile coverage
[2]–[6], mobile relaying [7], [8], mobile data collection [9],
[10], etc. In UAV-based wireless communication systems, how
to secure the transmission of confidential information against
intentional or unintentional eavesdropping is an important
problem. In this paper, we focus our study on physical-layer
security, which has been extensively investigated in wireless
communication as a viable anti-eavesdropping technique. The
key design metric in physical-layer security that has been
widely adopted is the so-called secrecy rate (e.g. [11]–[15]),
at which confidential message can be reliably transmitted
without having the eavesdropper infer any information about
the message.
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A non-zero secrecy rate can be achieved when the strength
of the legitimate link is stronger than that of the eavesdrop-
ping link. In the existing literature on PHY layer security,
communication nodes are usually assumed to be at fixed or
quasi-static locations. As a result, the average channel quality
of the legitimate/eavesdropping link mainly depends on the
path loss and shadowing from the transmitter to receiver,
which are predetermined if the locations of the legitimate
transmitter/receiver and the eavesdropper are given. Thus, in
the case that the average channel gain of the legitimate receiver
is smaller than that of the eavesdropper (e.g., due to longer
distance from the legitimate transmitter), in order to achieve
positive secrecy rates, the exploitation of the wireless channel
small-scale fading in time, frequency and/or space becomes
essential, and various techniques such as power control [11],
artificial noise (AN) [12], cooperative jamming [13], as well as
multi-antenna beamforming [14], [15] have been investigated.
However, there are still two major challenges that remain
unsolved in the existing literature. First, the achievable secrecy
rate can be limited if the distance between the legitimate trans-
mitter and its intended receiver is fixed and significantly larger
than that between it and a potential eavesdropper, even if the
techniques mentioned above are applied. Second, the channel
state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is usually required
at the legitimate transmitter for the implementation of the
above techniques, which is challenging since the eavesdropper
is generally a passive device and it is thus difficult to estimate
its CSI.
In this paper, we study PHY layer security in UAV com-
munications, which may potentially overcome the above two
critical issues in conventional studies. First, in contrast to
the existing literature with fixed or quasi-static nodes, the
mobility of UAV is exploited to proactively establish stronger
legitimate links with the ground nodes and/or degrade the
channels of the eavesdroppers, by flying closer/farther to/from
them, respectively, in its trajectory design. This is because
in the UAV communications, the line-of-sight (LoS) channels
of the UAV-to-ground links are usually much more dominant
over other channel impairments such as shadowing or small-
scale fading due to the much larger height of the UAV than the
ground nodes. Furthermore, the UAV can practically obtain the
channel gain to any potential eavesdropper on the ground by
obtaining its location, which thus resolves the eavesdropper-
CSI issue in the existing literature. Note that the location of
Fig. 1. A UAV wireless communication system consisting of a UAV
transmitter (Alice) above ground, a legitimate receiver (Bob) on the ground,
and an eavesdropper (Eve) on the ground.
any ground node as a potential eavesdropper can be detected
and tracked by the UAV via using an optical camera or
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) equipped on the UAV [16].
For the purpose of exposition, we consider a simplified
system as shown in Fig. 1, where a UAV is deployed to
send confidential information to a legitimate receiver in the
presence of an eavesdropper, while the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper are both at fixed positions on the ground. Our
goal is to maximize the average secrecy rate over a finite flight
period of the UAV by jointly designing the UAV trajectory
and transmit power control, subject to the average and peak
transmit power constraints, as well as the practical mobility
constraints on the UAV’s maximum speed and its initial and
final locations. The formulated joint trajectory design and
power control problem for secrecy rate maximization is non-
convex and thus difficult to be solved optimally. To tackle this
challenge, we propose an efficient algorithm by applying the
block coordinate descent and successive convex optimization
methods to find an approximate solution for the formulated
problem. The proposed algorithm divides the design variables
into two blocks, which correspond to UAV transmit power and
trajectory over time, respectively, and updates the two blocks
of variables one at each time with the other fixed alternately
until the algorithm converges. Numerical results show that the
proposed joint design can significantly improve the secrecy
rate of UAV communication system, as compared to bench-
mark schemes without applying the trajectory optimization or
transmit power control.
It is worth noting that there have been prior works (e.g. [7],
[17]–[19]) on trajectory optimization for various UAV commu-
nication systems, which consider different system setups and
performance metrics. In [7], a UAV-enabled mobile relaying
system is investigated, where the UAV trajectory and transmit
power are jointly designed to maximize the throughput. In
[17], the UAV flying heading is optimized to maximize the
achievable sum rate from ground nodes to a UAV by assuming
a constant flying speed. In [18], a UAV-enabled base station
system serving multiple ground users is investigated, where the
UAV trajectory and user scheduling are jointly optimized to
maximize the minimum throughput of all users. In [19], a new
design paradigm that jointly considers both the communication
throughput and the UAV’s flying energy consumption is stud-
ied to maximize the energy efficiency of a point-to-point UAV-
ground communication system. Different from these prior
studies, in this paper we apply trajectory optimization and
transmit power control to maximize the secrecy rate of a UAV
wireless communication system.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a wireless communication
system where a UAV (Alice) transmits information to a legiti-
mate receiver (Bob) in the presence of a passive eavesdropper
(Eve). We assume that Bob and Eve are both on the ground and
have fixed locations, with a distance of L meters (m) between
them.
Without loss of generality, we consider a three-dimensional
(3D) Cartesian coordinate system with Bob and Eve located at
(0, 0, 0) and (L, 0, 0), respectively. For simplicity, we ignore
the take-off and landing phases of Alice, and focus on its
operation period over a finite duration T . It is assumed that
Alice flies at a fixed altitude H above ground, which can
be considered as the minimum altitude required for building
avoidance. The time-varying coordinate of Alice can be de-
noted as (x(t), y(t), H), 0 ≤ t ≤ T . For convenience, we
divide the period T into N time slots with equal length, i.e.,
T = Ndt, with dt denoting the length of a time slot, which is
sufficiently small such that Alice’s location can be regarded as
constant within each time slot. As a result, Alice’s coordinate
in time slot n can be denoted as (x[n], y[n], H). Thus, Alice’s
horizontal trajectory (x(t), y(t)) over the flight period T can
be approximated by the sequence {x[n], y[n]}Nn=1. Denote the
maximum speed of Alice as vmax > 0. The maximum flying
distance of Alice in each time slot is thus V = vmaxdt. The
initial and final locations of Alice are denoted by (x0, y0, H)
and (xF , yF , H), respectively, which are given based on the
specific mission of Alice. As a result, the mobility constraints
of Alice can be expressed as
(x[1]− x0)
2 + (y[1]− y0)
2 ≤ V 2, (1a)
(x[n+ 1]− x[n])2 + (y[n+ 1]− y[n])2 ≤ V 2,
n = 1, . . . , N − 1, (1b)
(xF − x[N ])
2 + (yF − y[N ])
2 ≤ V 2. (1c)
We assume the channel from Alice to Bob and that from
Alice to Eve are dominated by LoS links. Thus the channel
power gain from Alice to Bob at time slot n follows the free-
space path loss model given by
gAB[n] = β0d
−2
AB [n] =
β0
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2
, (2)
where β0 denotes the channel power gain at the reference
distance d0 = 1m, which depends on the carrier frequency
and the antenna gains of the transmitter and receiver, and
dAB[n] =
√
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2 is the distance from Alice
to Bob at time slot n. Denote P [n] as the transmit power of
Alice at time slot n, which is constrained by both average and
peak power limits, denoted by P¯ and Ppeak, respectively. The
transmit power constraints of Alice can be expressed as
1
N
N∑
n=1
P [n] ≤ P¯ , (3a)
0 ≤ P [n] ≤ Ppeak, ∀n. (3b)
To make the constraints above non-trivial, we assume P¯ <
Ppeak in this paper. Without the presence of Eve, the achievable
rate from Alice to Bob in bits/sec/Hertz (bps/Hz) at time slot
n can be expressed as
RAB[n] = log2
(
1 +
P [n]gAB[n]
σ2
)
= log2
(
1 +
γ0P [n]
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2
)
,
(4)
where σ2 is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) power
at the Bob receiver and γ0 = β0/σ
2 is the reference signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR). Similarly, the achievable rate from Alice
to Eve in bps/Hz at time slot n is given by
RAE[n] = log2
(
1 +
γ0P [n]
(x[n]− L)2 + y2[n] +H2
)
. (5)
With (4) and (5), the average secrecy rate from Alice to Bob
in bps/Hz over N time slots is given by [11]
Rsec =
1
N
N∑
n=1
[RAB[n]−RAE[n]]
+
, (6)
where [x]+ , max(x, 0).
Our objective is to maximize the average secrecy rate
Rsec given in (6) subject to Alice’s mobility constraints
in (1) and the average and peak power constraints in (3).
The optimization variables include the transmit power over
slots P , [P [1], . . . , P [N ]]
†
and Alice’s trajectory in terms
of its x and y axis position coordinates in different slots
x , [x[1], . . . , x[N ]]
†
and y , [y[1], . . . , y[N ]]
†
, respectively,
where the superscript † denotes the transpose operation. Thus,
we formulate the secrecy rate maximization problem as (by
ignoring the constant term 1/N in (6))
(P1) : max
x,y,P
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
γ0P [n]
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2
)
− log2
(
1 +
γ0P [n]
(x[n]− L)2 + y2[n] +H2
)]+
(7)
s.t. (1), (3).
Problem (P1) is difficult to be solved optimally due to the
following two reasons. First, the operator [·]+ makes the
objective function non-smooth at point zero. Second, even
without [·]+, the objective function is still non-concave with
respect to either x, y, or P in general. As a result, it is
challenging to find the optimal solution to (P1) efficiently.
Thus, we propose an iterative algorithm to solve it in the next
section.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR PROBLEM (P1)
It can be shown that problem (P1) can be transformed into
the following problem equivalently, i.e.,
(P2) : max
x,y,P
N∑
n=1
log2
(
1 +
γ0P [n]
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2
)
− log2
(
1 +
γ0P [n]
(x[n] − L)2 + y2[n] +H2
)
(8)
s.t. (1), (3).
Problems (P1) and (P2) have the same optimal solution due to
the fact that the value of each summation term in the objective
function of both problems, i.e., RAB[n] − RAE[n], ∀n, must
be non-negative at optimality. This is because if RAB[n] −
RAE[n] < 0 for any n, we can always increase its value in the
objective to zero by setting P [n] = 0 without violating the
power constraints (3).
Although problem (P2) resolves the non-smooth issue, it
is still non-convex and difficult to solve. Based on the block
coordinate descent method, we propose an iterative algorithm
to solve (P2). Specifically, the optimization variables are
partitioned into two blocks., i.e., P for transmit power control
and (x,y) for UAV trajectory design. As a result, problem (P2)
are divided into two subproblems: one (denoted by subproblem
1) optimizes the transmit power P under given trajectory
(x,y); while the other (denoted by subproblem 2) optimizes
the trajectory (x,y) under given transmit power P. These two
subproblems are solved in an alternating manner iteratively
until the algorithm converges. The details of the proposed
algorithm are given as follow.
A. Subproblem 1: Optimizing Transmit Power For Given Tra-
jectory
Let
an =
γ0
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2
, (9)
bn =
γ0
(x[n]− L)2 + y2[n] +H2
. (10)
Subproblem 1 can be accordingly expressed as
max
P
N∑
n=1
ln (1 + anP [n])− ln (1 + bnP [n]) (11)
s.t. (3),
where the property log2 x = lnx/ ln 2 is used. Although (11)
is a non-convex optimization problem, it has been shown in
[11] that the optimal solution can be obtained as
P ∗[n] =
{
min
(
[Pˆ [n]]+, Ppeak
)
an > bn,
0 an ≤ bn,
(12)
where
Pˆ [n] =
√(
1
2bn
−
1
2an
)2
+
1
λ
(
1
bn
−
1
an
)
−
1
2bn
−
1
2an
.
(13)
In the above, λ ≥ 0 is a constant that ensures the average
power constraint 1
N
∑N
n=1 P [n] ≤ P¯ to be satisfied when the
optimal solution of problem (11) is attained, which can be
found efficiently via bisection search [20].
B. Subproblem 2: Optimizing Trajectory For Given Transmit
Power
Let Pn = γ0P [n]. Subproblem 2 can be equivalently
expressed as
max
x,y
N∑
n=1
[
ln
(
1 +
Pn
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2
)
− ln
(
1 +
Pn
(x[n]− L)2 + y2[n] +H2
)]
(14)
s.t. (1).
Note that the objective function of problem (14) is non-
concave with respect to x and y, so it cannot be solved
efficiently. By introducing slack variables t = [t[1], . . . , t[N ]]
†
and u = [u[1], . . . , u[N ]]
†
, we formulate the following prob-
lem
max
x,y,t,u
N∑
n=1
[
ln
(
1 +
Pn
u[n]
)
− ln
(
1 +
Pn
t[n]
)]
(15a)
s.t. t[n]− x2[n] + 2Lx[n]− L2 − y2[n]−H2 ≤ 0, ∀n
(15b)
t[n] ≥ 0, ∀n, (15c)
x2[n] + y2[n] +H2 − u[n] ≤ 0, ∀n, (15d)
(1).
It can be verified that with the optimal solution of problem
(15), constraints (15b) and (15d) should hold with equalities
since otherwise, t[n] (u[n]) can be increased (decreased) to
improve the objective value. Therefore, problems (14) and (15)
have the same optimal solution of (x,y). Next, we focus on
solving problem (15).
The term ln
(
1 + Pn
u[n]
)
in (15a) and the terms −x2[n] and
−y2[n] in (15b) make problem (15) non-convex and difficult
to be solved optimally. Based on the successive convex op-
timization method, we propose the following algorithm for
problem (15) to obtain an approximate solution. The algorithm
assumes a given initial point xfea , [xfea[1], . . . , xfea[N ]]
†
,
yfea , [yfea[1], . . . , yfea[N ]]
†
and ufea , [ufea[1], . . . , ufea[N ]]
†
,
which is feasible to (15).
Since ln
(
1 + Pn
u[n]
)
is a convex function of u[n], its first-
order Taylor expansion at ufea[n] is a global under-estimator,
i.e.,
ln
(
1 +
Pn
u[n]
)
≥ ln
(
1 +
Pn
ufea[n]
)
−
Pn(u[n]− ufea[n])
u2fea[n] + Pnufea[n]
.
(16)
Since −x2[n] and −y2[n] are concave functions, their first-
order Taylor expansions at xfea[n] and yfea[n] are global over-
estimators, i.e.,
− x2[n] ≤ x2fea[n]− 2xfea[n]x[n], (17)
− y2[n] ≤ y2fea[n]− 2yfea[n]y[n]. (18)
With (16)–(18), problem (15) is recast as
max
x,y,t,u
N∑
n=1
[
−
Pnu[n]
u2fea[n] + Pnufea[n]
− ln
(
1 +
Pn
t[n]
)]
(19a)
s.t. t[n] + x2fea[n]− 2xfea[n]x[n] + 2Lx[n]− L
2
+ y2fea[n]− 2yfea[n]y[n]−H
2 ≤ 0, ∀n, (19b)
(1), (15c), (15d).
Since the objective function of problem (19) is concave, and
the feasible region is convex, it is a convex optimization
problem, which can be efficiently solved by the interior-
point method [20]. Since the first constraint of problem (19)
implies that of problem (15), the solution of problem (19)
is guaranteed to be a feasible solution of problem (15).
Moreover, since problem (19) maximizes the lower bound of
the objective function of problem (15), and the lower bound
and the objective function of (15) are equal only at the given
point (xfea,yfea,ufea), the objective value of problem (15) with
the solution obtained by solving problem (19) is no smaller
than that with the given point (xfea,yfea,ufea).
C. Overall Algorithm
In summary, the proposed algorithm solves the two sub-
problems (11) and (19) alternately in an iterative manner.
Since the objective value of (P2) with the solutions obtained
by solving the subproblems is non-decreasing over iteration,
and the optimal value of (P2) is finite, the solution by the
proposed algorithm is guaranteed to converge. The details of
the proposed algorithm are summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Proposed Algorithm for Problem (P1).
1: Initialization: Set an initial feasible solution
(P(0),x(0),y(0)), an initial slack variable u(0) and
k = 0.
2: repeat
3: Set k ← k + 1;
4: With given P(k−1), set the feasible points xfea =
x(k−1), yfea = y
(k−1) and ufea = u
(k−1), then update
the trajectory variable (x(k),y(k)) and the slack variable
u(k) by solving problem (19);
5: With given (x(k),y(k)), update the transmit power
control variable P(k) by using (12).
6: until The fractional increase of the objective value is
below a small threshold ǫ.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to verify the
performance of our proposed joint trajectory optimization and
power control algorithm (denoted as “TO w/ PC”), as com-
pared to the following two benchmark algorithms: trajectory
optimization without power control “TO w/o PC” and line-
segment trajectory with optimal power control “line w/ PC”.
In the “TO w/o PC” algorithm, transmit power is equally
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Fig. 2. Trajectories of Alice using different algorithms.
allocated to time slots as P [n] = P¯ , ∀n, and the UAV
trajectory is optimized by solving problem (19) iteratively until
convergence. In the “line w/ PC” algorithm, Alice flies to the
point above Bob at the maximum speed, then remains at that
point, and finally flies at the maximum speed in order to reach
its final location by the end of the last time slot. If Alice does
not have enough time to reach Bob, it will turn at a certain
midway point and then fly to the final location at the maximum
speed. Thus, the trajectory by this algorithm constitutes only
line segments. Given this trajectory, optimal power control is
implemented based on (12).
The distance between Bob and Eve is set as L = 200m,
and the flying altitude is set to H = 100m. The coordinates
of Alice’s initial and final locations are set as (x0, y0) =
(100, 200)m and (xF , yF ) = (100,−200)m. The commu-
nication bandwidth is 20MHz with the carrier frequency at
5GHz, and the noise power spectrum density is −169dBm/Hz.
Thus, the reference SNR at the reference distance d0 = 1m
is γ0 = 80dB. The maximum speed of Alice is vmax = 2m/s.
The flight time T is divided into multiple time slots with equal
length, and the length of each time slot is set as dt = 0.5s.
The average power limit is set to P¯ = −5dBm, and the
peak transmit power limit is Ppeak = 4P¯ . The threshold ǫ
in Algorithm 1 is set as 10−4.
Fig. 2 shows the trajectories of UAV/Alice using different
algorithms with different values of T . The locations of Bob,
Eve, Alice’s initial and final locations are marked with ©, △,
×, and +, respectively. It is observed that when T = 200s, it
is just enough for Alice to fly from the initial location to the
final location in a straight line at the maximum speed, so the
trajectories of the “TO w/ PC”, “TO w/o PC” and “line w/ PC”
algorithms are identical. The trajectories of the “TO w/ PC”
and “TO w/o PC” algorithms are similar for different values
of T , i.e., Alice tries to fly as close as possible to Bob and
at the same time as away as possible to Eve as T increases.
When T is sufficiently large, i.e. T = 250s, Alice first flies at
T (s)
200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ra
te
 (b
ps
/H
z)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Line w/ PC
TO w/o PC
TO w/ PC
Fig. 3. Secrecy rate versus flight time T .
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate versus average transmit power P¯ .
the maximum speed to reach a certain location (not directly
above Bob), then remains stationary at this location as long as
possible, and finally flies to the final location at the maximum
speed and reach there by the end of the last time slot. The
hovering locations can be shown to be the best locations for
maximizing the secrecy rates for the two algorithms with and
without power control, respectively.
Fig. 3 shows the average secrecy rates of different algo-
rithms versus flight time T . It is observed that the secrecy
rates of all algorithms increase with T . This is because for
all algorithms the maximum secrecy rate is achieved at the
respective hovering locations (see Fig. 2), and larger T results
in longer hovering time. The proposed “TO w/ PC” algorithm
always achieves the highest secrecy rate, compared to the other
two benchmark algorithms.
Fig. 4 shows the average secrecy rates of different algo-
rithms versus the average transmit power P¯ with different
values of T . It is observed that the proposed “TO w/ PC”
algorithm always achieves the best secrecy rate. The “line w/
PC” algorithm achieves a secrecy rate performance close to
the “TO w/ PC” algorithm, and significantly outperforms the
“TO w/o PC” algorithm when P¯ ≤ −5dB. This is because
power control is more effective in improving secrecy rate than
trajectory optimization when the average transmit power is
low. It is observed that when P¯ increases, the secrecy rate
of the “TO w/o PC” algorithm exceeds that of the “line w/
PC” algorithm, and gets closer to that of the “TO w/ PC”
algorithm. The rate gap between the “line w/ PC” and “TO
w/o PC” algorithms becomes larger with increasing P¯ . This is
because trajectory optimization is more effective in improving
secrecy rate than power control when the average transmit
power is sufficiently large. The above results demonstrate the
importance and necessity of the joint trajectory optimization
and transmit power control in maximizing the secrecy rate.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the physical-layer secrecy commu-
nication in a new UAV-to-ground communication setup by
exploiting the UAV trajectory design in addition to the conven-
tional power/rate adaptation. The transmit power control and
UAV trajectory are jointly designed to maximize the average
secrecy rate over a finite horizon, subject to the average and
peak transmit power constraints as well as practical UAV’s
mobility constraints. By applying the block coordinate descent
and successive convex optimization methods, we propose an
efficient iterative algorithm to solve this design problem.
Numerical results show that the new approach of proactively
controlling channel gains by adjusting the UAV trajectory with
joint power control can significantly improve the physical-
layer security performance of UAV communication systems.
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